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THE BACKGROUND AS A QUANTUM OBSERVABLE:
EINSTEIN’S HOLE ARGUMENT IN A QUASICLASSICAL
CONTEXT
I. SCHMELZER
Abstract. I consider a thought experiment measuring the decoherence for
quasiclassical superpositions of gravitational field. A version of the hole argu-
ment allows to prove that a covariant (background-free) theory is completely
unable to define the outcome of this experiment and is therefore not viable.
Instead, the results of experiments of this type allow to reconstruct a common
background shared by all superposed gravitational fields.
1. Introduction
The quantization of general relativity is known to be extremely difficult: More
than eighty years after the creation of the two theories themself the problem is
yet not solved in a “satisfactory” way. Here, with “satisfactory” in scare quotes
we mean a quite popular requirement – that the theory should be background-
independent. This property is considered by many physicists (for example Smolin
[11] or Thiemann [14]) as an extremely important property of classical general
relativity which should be preserved in its quantum version.
The aim of this paper is to show that the problem is not only difficult – a
background-free theory of quantum gravity is impossible. We propose a thought
experiment such that its result cannot be predicted by a background-free theory.
This sounds negative, but the message is a positive one. It follows that the quantum
interference effects we consider give us new, non-classical observational possibilities.
The results of these experiments not only depend on the background, but contain
at least in principle sufficient information to recover the background. Roughly
speaking, the background becomes observable in quantum gravity.
The experiment is a partial position measurement for a sufficiently heavy particle
(which is in a superpositional state) by gravitational interaction with a lightweight
particle. The question is if the gravitational interaction leads to decoherence or
not, and the degree of decoherence. For this purpose, we can ignore the state of the
test particle, and it is sufficient to observe the resulting state of the heavy particle.
With “electromagnetic” instead of “gravitational”, this experiment can be easily
realized. Unfortunately the gravitational field is simply too weak to give nontrivial
observable results. But it is straightforward to compute the result in Newtonian
quantum gravity (another word for Schro¨dinger theory with Newtonian interaction
potential). We start with the two-particle state
(1) Ψin =
1√
2
(|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉)|φ0〉,
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where the states |ψi〉 of the heavy particle are localized near different points xi so
that ψi(x, t) ≈ δ(x − xi), and |φ0〉 denoted the initial state of the lightweight test
particle. Because of the mass difference, the Newtonian gravitational interaction
will leave the basic states of the heavy particle |ψi〉 approximately unchanged, while
the resulting state of the lightweight particle changes. Nonetheless, if the heavy
particle is in one of the localized basic states |ψi〉, the resulting state will remain
approximately in a product state, with the lightweight particle in the resulting state
|φi〉 which (if the difference in the gravitational forces is large enough) depends on
the position of the heavy particle xi. For the superpositional initial state (1) this
leads to a resulting two-particle state
(2) Ψout =
1√
2
(|ψ1〉|φ1〉+ |ψ2〉|φ2〉)
The ignorance of the state of the lightweight test particle leads to a density matrix
state ρˆθ for the heavy particle defined by
(3) ρˆθ =
1
2
(
(
∑
i
|ψi〉〈ψi|) + θ|ψ2〉〈ψ1|+ θ|ψ1〉〈ψ2|
)
where the complex number θ is defined by the scalar product
(4) θ = 〈φ1|φ2〉 =
∫
φ1(x)φ2(x)d
3x.
Observing the remaining interference pattern defined by this state of the heavy par-
ticle, we can measure θ. The remaining degree of interference is defined by |θ|. For
|θ| = 0 no interference pattern is observable, the interference has been completely
lost because of decoherence. Else, one can also observe a possible phase shift of
the interference pattern caused by the gravitational interaction, which defines the
phase of θ.
One may want to compute relativistic corrections. For the heavy particle local-
ized exactly in xi semiclassical gravity allows to compute such corrections. But
superpositions of states described by different gravitational fields are already out-
side the domain of applicability of the semiclassical approximation.
Nonetheless, one can make a naive attempt. One can use semiclassical gravity
to compute general-relativistic corrections for the wave function φi(x, t), and then
simply apply (4). That means, instead of computing the |φi〉 considering their New-
tonian interactions with the |ψi〉 localized in xi, we compute the |φi〉 considering
the movement of a single particle (ignoring as a first approximation particle cre-
ation and destruction and other semiclassical subtleties) on a curved background
giµν(x, t), which is defined as the GR solution with the heavy (classical) particle
localized in xi. Then we simply put the resulting wave functions φi into formula
(4) and have obtained a prediction for θ.
Unfortunately this naive computation does not work. The problem is the choice
of the coordinates. What is the system of coordinates x to be used in (4)?
To see the problem let’s remember that GR defines the solutions gµν(x, t) only
modulo arbitrary changes of coordinates. This remains true also in semiclassical
GR. In this case, the change of coordinates leads to a nontrivial transformation
of the fields moving on the background too. If we restrict ourself for simplicity to
changes of coordinates which leave time t unchanged, wave functions will transform
like square roots of densities. Thus, φ would have to be replaced by another wave
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function φ′. As long as we consider only one background, this does not cause prob-
lems. But in (4) two different background fields giµν(x, t) are involved, and there
is a freedom of choice of coordinates on each of them. Thus, nothing prevents us
from changing the system of coordinates for φ2(x, t), g
2
µν(x, t), leaving the coordi-
nates on φ1(x, t), g
1
µν(x, t) unchanged. It follows that φ2(x, t) has to be replaced
by a transformed wave function φ′2(x, t), but φ1(x, t) remains fixed. But the scalar
product (4) does not remain invariant:
(5)
∫
φ1(x)φ2(x)d
3x 6=
∫
φ1(x)φ
′
2(x)d
3x.
Which value defines the observable θ in (4)? This is the problem we consider in
this paper.
One could think that we have to use in (4) a system of coordinates for φ2 which in
some sense “corresponds” to the system of coordinates used for φ1. Unfortunately,
GR does not define such “corresponding” systems of coordinates for different solu-
tions. The systems of coordinates of different solutions are in no way connected with
each other. In principle, different solutions may live even on topologically different
manifolds, so that no continuous correspondence relation between the events of the
different solutions exists. But even if the manifolds are, in above cases, diffeomorph
to R4, to define a scalar product we would have to fix some diffeomorphism between
them. But GR does not fix any such diffeomorphism between different solutions.
The scalar product (4) is simply undefined in GR.
Another natural reaction is to blame quantum strangeness for this problem. We
need a full quantum theory of gravity to make a prediction, but we do not have such
a theory yet. But do we really need it? Quantum strangeness has not prevented us
from computing the prediction in Newtonian quantum gravity. Even more, there
is a simple class of classical theories of gravity such that quantum strangeness does
not prevent us from computing the prediction using the same formula (4) as in
Newtonian quantum gravity, following the naive scheme considered above. All we
need to apply (4) is a background. Once we have a common background shared
by all gravitational fields, the problem disappears. The system of coordinates x,
to be used in (4), is simply the system of coordinates of the background. The
background gives exactly what we need – corresponding systems of coordinates for
different solutions.
Thus, there is no reason to blame quantum strangeness for the failure of GR.
The competing theories of gravity with background, faced with the same quantum
strangeness, have no problem at all with computing a prediction for our simple
thought experiment. The rules of the scientific method for thought experiments
seem sufficiently clear about what to do in this case. Popper’s criterion of empirical
content may be applied also to predictions about thought experiments – the theory
which makes more predictions has to be preferred. Theories with background make
predictions, GR not, thus, theories with background have to be preferred.
But this is hardly a sufficient argument for a community which thinks that “back-
ground independence is . . .The Key Feature of quantum gravity” [14] (original
emphasis). If combined with the idea that “[t]he whole formalism of ordinary QFT
heavily relies on this background structure and collapses to nothing when it is miss-
ing” [14] and that “[n]o matter how one deals with this issue . . . one has to invent
something drastically new in order to quantize the gravitational field” [14], no par-
ticular mathematical problem of background-independent theories seems sufficient.
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But is this argument strong enough to destroy the strong support for GR and the
philosophical idea of background freedom? The aim of this paper is to consider this
question in more detail. We find that the problem is not only a GR problem, but
one of the concept of background freedom. We prove an impossibility theorem for a
whole class of theories with background freedom which is more general than GR. It
contains, in particular, also theories which solve the problem of time in a trivial way,
by the introduction of a preferred foliation, but are spatially background-free, that
means, have active diffeomorphism invariance for diffeomorphisms which preserve
the preferred foliation.
We also look at the situation from the other side. Given a theory with back-
ground, we can compute the θ. But can we, given the θ for all imaginable exper-
iments of this type, recover the background? We find a positive answer. In other
words, with the thought experiment presented here, the background becomes in
principle observable.
Given that the average reader may not know them, we give a very short intro-
duction into a few theories of gravity with background we consider most promising.
And we discuss, in a lot of (hopefully not boring) detail, lots of possible objections.
2. Definitions
The aim of the paper is to prove an impossibility result for a certain, quite
general class of quantum theories of gravity. But we do not fix properties of the
theory itself. Instead, we fix only properties of certain approximations. We consider
different approximations, and sometimes have to switch between these different
approximations. Moreover, we want to cover different theories of gravity, which
differ already in their classical approximations. Because this collection of different
approximations of different theories may become confusing, it seems useful to give
here an overview and a description of the precise meaning of the terms we use
to describe these theories and approximations. By the way, we introduce some
denotations of the objects of these theories and approximations.
• First, there is classical gravity. This term means non-quantum, not non-
relativistic. We consider here only metric theories of gravity, thus, the grav-
itational field is assumed to be described by a spacetime metric gµν(x, t).
There are three interesting subclasses of these theories: First, completely
background-free theories. This is, essentially, general relativity. Then, the-
ories with background. Here, the important examples are bimetric theories
with a Minkowski background and theories which assume a classical Newto-
nian spacetime R3×R as a background. The key property of these theories
is that for any event (x, t) of one solution there exists a corresponding event
(denoted by the same (x, t)) on each other solution, provided that such an
identification is given for the initial values t = t0 and boundary conditions.
The third class are spatially background-free theories. Here, the property of
background freedom is restricted to diffeomorphisms which preserve a given
time coordinate t: The theory should be covariant for arbitrary coordinate
transformations of the form t′ = t, x′ = x′(x, t). A generally covariant the-
ory is, of course, covariant for this restricted class of diffeomorphisms too,
whatever the choice of the time coordinate. Thus, completely background-
free theories are also spatially background-free.
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To define a solution of classical gravity we use the denotation gµν(x, t).
But let’s note here that the restriction to metric theories of gravity is not
essential, the argumentation would not change much if gravity would be
described by other fields – only the denotations would become more uncom-
mon. The denotation giµν(x, t) is used for a particular solution of classical
gravity which contains a heavy point particle at the position xi.
• Next, there is the semiclassical approximation. The gravitational field in the
semiclassical approximation is described by a solution of the corresponding
classical theory of gravity gµν(x, t). On this background, quantum theory is
developed. So, the gravitational field influences the quantum fields, but the
state of the quantum fields does not influence the gravitational field. We
have localized one particle near some points xi and described it as “heavy”,
but the other one as “lightweight” to make this approximation applicable:
The heavy particle in a classical position xi defines a classical gravitational
field giµν(x, t), which influences the quantum lightweight particle, but the
influence of the lightweight particle on the heavy particle in xi and on the
gravitational field giµν(x, t) created by the heavy particle can be ignored.
Semiclassical gravity is an established theory, usually applied in combi-
nation with GR as the corresponding classical theory. But the techniques
do not depend on this and may be applied as well if a different classical
metric theory of gravity is used. To describe the state of the quantum
system on the background giµν(x, t) we use the denotation |φi〉.
• Then there is the one-particle approximation of the semiclassical approxi-
mation. In full semiclassical approximation, there are not only effects of
particle creation and destruction by the gravitational field, but even the
definition of the notion of particles and the vacuum state is problematic.
Therefore one usually considers field theories as the quantum theories on
curved backgrounds. Nonetheless, there will be some domain (say, suf-
ficiently weak gravitational fields combined with a sufficiently nice time
coordinate t) where a one-particle approximation is appropriate.
In these cases, the quantum state φ can be described by a single particle
wave function denoted by φ(x, t). In particular, the wave function of the
test particle on the background giµν(x, t) the wave function will be denoted
by φi(x, t).
• Then there is the approximation we have named here quasiclassical approx-
imation. The notion “quasiclassical” is widely used in different meanings,
so this is a sort of non-standard use, but we have not found a better notion
to distinguish this class of approximations.
This class contains all the states described in a semiclassical approxima-
tion but also finite superpositions of semiclassical states which correspond
to different classical metrics. For a state connected with a classical grav-
itational field giµν(x, t) we use the denotation |giµν〉. Together with the
quantum state of the lightweight particle |φi〉 on this background this de-
fines the state |giµν〉 ⊗ |φi〉. Such states will be named “semiclassical”, and
may be superposed with other semiclassical states which may be connected
with other classical metrics.
What distinguishs this approximation from full quantum gravity is that
we do not care about the quantum uncertainties in the definition of the
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states |gµν〉. In a full quantum theory, operators measuring different com-
ponents of the metric may not commute, and the quantum state |gµν〉 may
possibly only approximate the classical metric gµν(x, t) at a given moment
t, similar to coherent states which can only approximate a classical state
δ(p − p0)δ(q − q0). These possible uncertainties are ignored in the qua-
siclassical approximation. The quasiclassical approximation is conceptu-
ally interesting because, on the one hand, the conceptually most important
quantum effects – superpositional states of gravitational fields – are already
present, while, on the other hand, we can yet work with the classical gravi-
tational fields gµν(x, t). In particular, we can easily define the appropriate
notion of covariance or background-freedom in this approximation.
• Then there is, of course, Newtonian quantum gravity. This is simply multi-
particle Schro¨dinger theory with Newtonian interaction potential, but, de-
spite this simplicity, it is a full (even if only non-relativistic) quantum theory
of gravity. In this theory the states of the heavy particle will be denoted
by ψi(x, t) or |ψi〉 while states of the lightweight particle will be denoted
by φi(x, t) or |φi〉.
• Last but not least, there is full quantum gravity. Informally, we use this
denotation to describe a quantum theory of gravity which describes also
relativistic effects correctly, and assume that it is a quantum theory, not
some modification of quantum theory which gives quantum theory only in
some limit. But essentially we make only assumptions about properties of
various approximations.
3. A thought experiment with a superposition of gravitational fields
To create a superpositional state of the gravitational field is, even if completely
unrealistic in practice, conceptually quite easy – all one has to do is to create a usual
superpositional state of some sufficiently heavy source particle. Thus, at least in
principle, we do not need more than a usual double slit arrangement, with two slits
at two points xi, which creates a superpositional state for a sufficiently heavy source
particle, and at least in principle the gravitational field created by this particle is
already in a superpositional state.
The resulting superpositional state interacts with its environment, and this in-
teraction leads, if it is sufficiently strong, to decoherence. What we are interested in
is the decoherence caused by the gravitational interaction. So we assume that there
is some lightweight particle which interacts gravitationally with the superpositional
state, and we want to compute the resulting decoherence effect. In practice, this ef-
fect is far too small to be important – the other forces are so much stronger that they
cause complete decoherence before the decoherence effect of the gravitational inter-
action becomes observable. But this is a practical problem, and nothing suggests
that the theoretical principles which work for the much stronger electromagnetic
interaction become invalid for gravity.
Let’s denote the states where the source particle is at a well-defined position xi
with |ψi〉. Then, our initial state is the superposition 1√2 (|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉).
Theorem 1 (the result of partial position measurement). Assume a pure super-
positional state 1√
2
(|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉) of some system interacts with some part of its
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environment. After the interaction, the state of the environment is ignored. As-
sume that the interaction leaves the basic states |ψi〉 (approximately) unchanged.
Then
(1) the resulting state ρˆθ of the system has (approximately) the form
(6) ρˆθ =
1
2
(
(
∑
i
|ψi〉〈ψi|) + θ|ψ2〉〈ψ1|+ θ¯|ψ1〉〈ψ2|
)
which is uniquely characterized by the complex number θ with |θ| ≤ 1;
(2) this number θ is observable.
(3) If the environment is initially in a pure state |φ0〉, then we have θ = 〈φ1|φ2〉,
where the |φi〉 are the resulting pure states of the environment if the system
is in the state |ψi〉.
(4) If, moreover, the environment is defined by a single particle, so that the
states |φi〉 are described by single particle wave functions φi(x, t), then
(7) θ = 〈φ1|φ2〉 =
∫
φ1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x.
Proof. The interaction is itself is defined by some unitary operator U acting on the
tensor product of the Hilbert spaces HS ⊗HE of the system and the environment.
Then, the ignorance of the environment means that all observations are restricted
to observations of system observables OS . This is equivalent to a reduction of the
complete density matrix on HS ⊗HE to a density matrix on HS alone.
Let’s consider at first the case where the environment is initially in a pure state
|φ0〉. Then the initial states |φ0〉⊗|ψi〉 remain (because of unitarity of the evolution)
to be pure states. But once the states |ψi〉 remain finally unchanged, all system
observables OS should give the same result as for the |ψi〉 themself, which happens
only if the resulting states are pure product states |φi〉 ⊗ |ψi〉. Once the evolution
is unitary, the initial state |φ0〉 ⊗ 1√2 (|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉) gives
(8) |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|φ1〉 ⊗ |ψ1〉+ |φ2〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉).
A measurement of a system observable OS gives then
(9) 〈ψ|OS |ψ〉 = 1
2
∑
ij
〈φi|1ˆ|φj〉〈ψi|OS |ψj〉
which coinsides with Tr(ρOS) for a density matrix of the system of the form
(10) ρ =
∑
ij
ρij |ψj〉〈ψi|; ρij = 1
2
〈φi|1ˆ|φj〉.
With this definition of the ρij , ρ is indeed a density matrix (self-adjoint, trace 1
and all eigenstates non-negative), with the additional property ρii =
1
2
. This is (7)
with θ = 〈φ1|φ2〉, so that we have already proven point 3. Point 4 is then a trivial
consequence.
To prove point 1 we have to consider the more general case that the environment
is initially already in a mixed state. This does not give much new, because this can
be described by a classical probability combination that the initial state is some
|φk0〉 with probability pk. Then the resulting state can also be described as such a
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combination, and gives a density matrix with the coefficients
(11) ρij =
1
2
∑
k
〈φki|pk|φkj〉.
This does not change the properties we have mentioned. States connected in this
way with a classical solution are named semiclassical states. ρ remains to be a
density matrix, and the additional restriction ρii =
1
2
remains intact too, so that
point 1 holds too.
The coefficients of the density matrix are known to be observable. But to see
this in detail, the representation of ρˆθ as
(12) ρˆθ = (1− |θ|)
(
1
2
∑
i
|ψi〉〈ψi|
)
+ |θ||ψα〉〈ψα|
where
(13) |ψα〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉+ eiα|ψ2〉); θ = |θ|eiα
may be useful. It shows that with proability 1 − |θ| the heavy particle is in the
diagonal state 1
2
∑ |ψi〉〈ψi| which does not give any interference, while with prob-
ability |θ| it is in the pure superpositional state |ψα〉, which differs from the initial
state only by a (possibly) different phase factor eiα. A standard measurement of
an interference pattern allows to measure |θ| (the remaining degree of interference)
as well as eiα if |θ| > 0 (an additional phase shift of the interference pattern in
comparison with the initial state). 
Note that the theorem does not refer to any specific properties of the environment
and the particular interaction, except that the basic states |ψi〉 are left invariant,
and this last property has been introduced only for reasons of simplicity. Thus, the
formula does not only hold in Newtonian quantum gravity, but in every quantum
theory where states of a system and its environment are represented by density
operators in a tensor product of Hilbert spaces HS ⊗HE and evolution is unitary.
Thus, a quite general interaction with some completely unspecified part of the
environment, which will be ignored after the interaction, gives an observable effect
characterized by some complex number θ.
The expression of the scalar product as an integral over x is, of course, only one
possibility. One can measure whatever property of the test particle one likes and,
then, ignore the results of this measurement, which gives a representation of the
scalar product as an integral over other variables.
4. The properties of the quasiclassical approximation
To prove our impossibility theorem we have to make assumptions about the
full quantum theory of gravity. The main assumption is that there exists some
approximation which we name “quasiclassical approximation” which has certain
properties.
Now, usually one would prefer not to use approximations – they are a cause of
error and uncertainty. It would be better to use, if possible, the exact theory.
But the logic of impossibility proofs is reverted. To make an impossibility the-
orem stronger, we have to weaken the assumptions made about the theories. To
postulate an exact property of the theory itself is a much stronger restriction than
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to postulate that the property holds only approximately. The consequence of the
latter, weaker assumption in an impossibility theorem is that a much larger class of
theories is shown to be invalid. Similarly, impossibility theorems become stronger
if they use weaker approximations. Therefore we try to find the weakest approxi-
mation of full quantum gravity where the problem appears. We consider this line
of argument in more detail later, in the sections 8.1, 8.2.
4.1. The assumption of a special time coordinate. We assume that, together
with the classical solution gµν(x, t), we have also some special time coordinate t.
One may object that this is problematic, because the most interesting case,
general relativity, does not define any preferred time coordinate. But it is for this
reason that we use the denotation “special” instead of “preferred”. We do not
require that the theory has a preferred time coordinate. We also do not require
that the special time coordinate t is fixed uniquely by the classical theory. We only
assume that in the domain of application of the quasiclassical approximation exists
some special time coordinate t so that the solution may be described in the form
gµν(x, t), and that this time coordinate has some nice properties specified later:
In particular, we want to use the time coordinate to define quantum states |gµν〉
of the gravitational field which corresponds to some some moment of time t of a
classical solution gµν(x, t). Then, we want to use this time coordinate to define
in a one-particle approximation a wave function φ(x, t) which allows a standard
probability interpretation ρ(x, t) = φ(x, t)φ(x, t). These are special properties of
the time coordinate t which may hold for some time coordinates but not for others.
Thus, a time coordinate having these properties is in some sense “special”.
The time coordinate is, therefore, not a property of the classical theory of gravity,
such that the classical theory of gravity has to define, uniquely, the time coordinate
t. Its existence is, instead, a particular property of solutions in the domain of appli-
cability of the quasiclassical approximation: Some solutions allow the introduction
of a nice time coordinate – fine, these solutions are inside the domain of applica-
bility of the approximation. Others do not allow such a time coordinate (say, GR
solutions with closed causal loops, or extravagant topologies) – no problem. The
approximation is not applicable for this particular solution. But we do not require
anywhere that the approximation is applicable to all solutions of the theory. Thus,
a theory which allows such a special time coordinate only for some solutions remains
to be covered by the impossibility theorem. Another solution allows even several
different such nice time coordinates – no problem too. A particular application of
the approximation can use each of them.
4.2. Theories with preferred time. But the case of theories which have a pre-
ferred time already in the classical theory is, of course, also interesting. To con-
sider such theories is one possible strategy to solve the notorious “problem of time”
of quantum general relativity. If there exists a fundamental preferred time, the
problem of time simply disappears. But what about covariance for purely spatial
diffeomorphisms? Even if one gives up to solve the problem of time, and accepts
the trivial solution defined by a preferred time, one may like the idea of background
freedom so much that one likes to save at least diffeomorphism invariance for purely
spatial diffeomorphisms. Or one may consider such a theory as an intermediate step
toward a fully background-free theory: First, we find a spatially background-free
theory with preferred time, and then we show that all these theories make the same
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observable predictions, independent of their choice of the preferred time. (This is,
essentially, the program of canonical quantum gravity.)
As we will see, these intermediate theories are also covered by our impossibility
theorem. The preferred time of such theories has another special property: The
theory is covariant for diffeomorphisms which preserve the preferred time, while it
is not known if it is covariant for general diffeomorphisms. Again, fully covariant
theories like GR are also covered.
But note that in the case of such theories with a “preferred” time the “special”
time coordinate t we have described in the last section is assumed to be identical
with the preferred time, even if these notions are conceptually different. The “pre-
ferred” time is a fundamental property defined already in the classical theory, which
exists for all solutions, and is connected with general properties like covariance for
diffeomorphisms preserving it. The “special” time coordinate is only a particular
property of particular solutions which make certain approximations applicable.
This is, again, not problematic. For theories with a preferred time, it means
that the domain of applicability of the quasiclassical approximation has a further
restriction – it may be applied only to those solutions where the preferred time
may be used also as the special time. For theories without preferred time, this
question does not exist. Diffeomorphism invariance is used only for the restricted
class of diffeomorphisms preserving special time, but this is sufficient to prove our
impossibility theorem.
4.3. Semiclassical states. The first use of the special time coordinate t is the
definition of the quantum state |gµν〉 of the gravitational field given a classical
solution gµν(x, t) and a moment of time t.
To define such a quantum state, one would assume some connection with the
initial value problem of the classical theory of gravity. Thus, one would assume
that one has to define at the moment t not only the solution gµν(x, t) itself, but
also some number of derivatives in t. Moreover, the classical theory can contain
some constraints for the initial values which have to be fulfilled. The specification
of these initial values and their constraints is something which depends on the
classical theory of gravity. Fortunately, we do not have to consider these questions,
because the specification by a solution gµν(x, t) together with a moment of time t
is sufficiently general, does not depend on the specific constraints of a particular
metric theory of gravity.
We also assume that the quantum state |gµν〉 is, in the approximation, uniquely
defined by the classical solution gµν(x, t) and a moment of time t. This will hold
only approximately. The initial values will contain field components themself as
well as time derivatives of them, and one would not expect that the corresponding
operators will commute in the quantum case. If they do not commute, it would be
as impossible to represent a metric gµν(x, t) exactly by a quantum state |gµν〉 as it
is impossible to represent the classical state δ(q − q0)δ(p− p0) by a quantum state
which has exactly the position q0 and momentum p0. There are nice replacements,
coherent states, which approximate such a state in a sufficiently accurate way, but
they are not uniquely defined. One can define coherent states for every choice of
accuracies ∆p and ∆q which fulfill the uncertainty relations. In a similar way, there
may be different states which approximate a given classical metric gµν(x, t). The
semiclassical approximation ignores these subtleties and assumes that there is a
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unique choice so that every classical metric gµν(x, t) at every moment of time t
defines a single quantum state |gµν〉 in a unique way.
We do not make here any assumptions that different initial values gµν(x, t) have
to lead to different states |gµν〉. In background-free theories different but equivalent
initial values for the classical problem may be described by the same quantum state.
4.4. One particle approximation. It is well-known that there is no consistent
one-particle theory on a curved background. There are not only effects like par-
ticle creation and destruction by the gravitational field, but even the definition of
the notion of a particle and the definition of the vacuum state in field theories is
problematic on a curved background.
Nonetheless, there is a domain where the one-particle approximation is appro-
priate – the domain where one has a preferable choice of the vacuum and particle
operators. A standard construction uses a Killing vector field. We have already
assumed that we have a special time coordinate and may use this time coordinate
for the definition of a preferred notion of a particle.
This is not complicate – at every point the metric gµν(x, t), together with the
special time coordinate t, defines also special vector which describes an observer
“at rest”, whose local time (as defined by local Einstein synchronization) coinsides
in linear approximation with the special time t. Then, for the definition of the
number of particles in some region one can use the response of particle counters
which are locally “at rest”.
But, again, it is not our task to develop some particular approaches to a new
theory of gravity, but, instead, to prove that a certain class of theories – background-
free theories – cannot reach its aims. So we start from the other side. Instead of
proposing a particular way to solve this problem, we assume that the theory of
gravity has somehow solved this problem, without specifying the way. It may be
something close to the way suggested in the previous paragraph, or it may be
something completely different. The point is that single particle approximations
are meaningful in some domain, at least as approximations, thus, a theory which
does not allow a single particle approximation seems something completely strange.
And, therefore, to assume that there is a domain of quantum gravity where single
particle theory is well-defined as an approximation is a completely reasonable and
very weak assumption.
Technically, there are two reasons why we prefer to consider the one-particle
approximation instead of the (also well understood) semiclassical multi-particle
theory: First, it is more close to Newtonian quantum gravity (multi-particle
Schro¨dinger theory with Newtonian interaction potential) where particle numbers
are conserved, and we can apply the same formula for the scalar product (4) in
above theories. But, more important, we follow the principle that the weaker the
approximation used, the stronger the impossibility result. So, once the problem
exists already in the one-particle approximation, we have to prefer it.
4.5. The main postulate. Thus, we assume now that the basic states |ψ1〉 and
|ψ2〉 are defined by solutions g1µν(x, t), g2µν(x, t) of some classical metric theory of
gravity (not necessarily GR). We restrict ourself to sufficiently weak gravitational
fields and a sufficiently plane foliation t. In this case, we can ignore effects of
particle creation and destruction by the gravitational field and consider a one-
particle approximation. The details of the evolution are not relevant – all we need
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is that, given the solutions giµν(x, t) and some initial value for the wave functions
φi(x, t) at t0 we can compute them for all times t. Note that the evolution should
not even be unitary, because there will be some probability of particle creation and
destruction which will be ignored in our approximation. All we would like to have
is summarized in the following postulate:
Postulate 1. The theory contains a subset of sufficiently well-behaved classical
solutions gµν(x, t) named “weak fields” such that these weak fields have the following
properties:
(1) For each weak field gµν(x, t) exists some corresponding “special” time co-
ordinate t.
(2) For each weak field gµν(x, t) and each moment of time t the theory defines
in an approximately unique way a so-called “semiclassical state” |gµν〉 of
the gravitational field.
(3) On the gravitational background defined by semiclassical states |gµν〉 exists a
well-defined single particle approximation so that the state |φ〉 of the particle
at the moment of time t is defined by a wave function φ(x, t) ∈ C. The
one-particle wave functions are elements of some Hilbert space H|gµν〉 with
the scalar product
〈φ1|φ2〉 =
∫
φ1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x; φi ∈ H|gµν〉.
(4) For different semiclassical states |g1µν〉, |g2µν〉 exists a non-degenerated
sesquilinear form on H|g1µν〉 × H|g2µν〉.
(5) For superpositional states 1√
2
(|g1µν〉+ |g2µν〉) of semiclassical states, the the-
ory predicts that the outcome θ of the experiment described in section 3 is
defined by this sesquilinear form as
θ = 〈φ1|φ2〉.
(6) The sesquilinear form on H|g1µν〉 × H|g2µν〉 is defined by
〈φ1|φ2〉 =
∫
φ1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x; φi ∈ H|giµν〉
5. The classical hole argument
Let’s remember Einstein’s hole argument [5] and its resolution in classical general
relativity. Let gµν(x) be a solution of the Einstein equations of general relativity
(GR). Let’s consider some bounded spacetime region Σ – the “hole”. It is located
in the future of the initial time x0 = t0.
1 Then we consider a nontrivial smooth dif-
feomorphism x′ = x′(x), which is trivial (x′(x) = x) outside Σ. As a consequence of
diffeomorphism invariance, the transformed metric g′µν(x
′), after formally replacing
x′ with x, gives a different solution g′µν(x) of the Einstein equations. It coinsides
with gµν(x) outside Σ, thus, defines a different solution with the same boundary
conditions and the same set of initial data at x0 = t0. Thus, at a first look, it seems
1 In Einstein’s version it was located in a region without any material processes. The conclusion
was, correspondingly, that the gravitational field cannot be uniquely defined by the distribution
of matter. This contradicts Mach’s principle, but this is something we have accepted. The
gravitational field has its own degrees of freedom, gravitational waves. Thus, this version of the
hole argument has only historical interest.
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that in GR the gravitational field cannot be uniquely defined by whatever set of
initial values and boundary conditions, for matter fields as well as the gravitational
field.
The GR solution of this problem is that the two solutions gµν(x) and g
′
µν(x),
while different as functions of x, cannot be distinguished by observation. What
naively looks like an observable – the value gµν(x) in a point x – appears to be
unobservable: Observables are connected with events, which have to be identified
by their relations to other events. For example, the event x1 may be identified by
the set of events at t0 which intersect its past light cone. But this same set at t0
defines, on the g′µν(x), another event x
′
1 = x
′(x1).
Thus, despite the classical hole argument, in GR all real, physical observables
are well-defined by the initial values and boundary conditions. But for the viability
of the covariant Einstein equations it is essential that there is no observable O
which allows to distinguish the two solutions gµν(x) and g
′
µν(x) connected via the
coordinate transformation x′ = x′(x) in the hole Σ.
6. The impossibility theorem
In our considerations it is sufficient to consider the hole argument for purely
spatial diffeomorphisms (x′, t′) = (x′(x, t), t), which preserve our fixed foliation of
spacetime: Covariance for this subgroup of diffeomorphisms is already sufficient
to prove our impossibility theorem. Of course, a fully covariant theory will be
covered anyway – the theory is also covariant for all spatial diffeomorphisms. But
in this way we cover also theories which are only spatially background-free, but use
a preferred foliation.
The definition of a spatially background-free theory of gravity is based on a
straightforward notion of equivalence of semiclassical configurations:
Definition 1 (equivalence). Assume the two configurations of one-particle semi-
classical gravity gµν(x, t), φ(x, t) and g
′
µν(x, t), φ
′(x, t) can be obtained from each
other using a spatial coordinate transformations x′ = x′(x) = (x′(x, t), t) via the
usual hole construction. That means, the application of the coordinate transforma-
tion x′(x) to the fields gµν(x, t), φ(x, t), where gµν(x, t) is transformed like a metric,
and φ(x, t) as the square root of a density, gives g′µν(x
′, t), φ′(x′, t), with x′ instead
of x. Then the two configurations are said to be equivalent.
Based on this notion of equivalence we can define now the meaning of background
independence:
Definition 2 (background independence). A quantum theory of gravity is spatially
background-free if equivalent semiclassical one-particle configurations gµν(x), φ(x)
and g′µν(x), φ
′(x) define (modulo the minimal uncertainties required by the uncer-
tainty principle) the same quantum state |gµν〉|φ〉.
In particular, a background-free theory in the usual sense will be also spatially
background-free.
Now we can formulate our main impossibility result:
Theorem 2. A viable quantum theory of gravity which fulfills postulate 1 cannot
be spatially background-free.
14 I. SCHMELZER
Proof. Let’s consider two configurations g1µν(x, t), φ1(x, t) and g
2
µν(x, t), φ2(x, t). If
there are no other than gravitational interactions and in the limit where gravita-
tional interaction can be ignored we have |〈φ1|φ2〉| = 1. This limit can always be
reached by moving the test particle away from the positions xi of the heavy particle.
Thus, we can assume |〈φ1|φ2〉| ≈ 1.
Then let’s assume that the wave functions φi have finite support U in space
for each moment of time t. This can be reached at least approximately, with
a probability of the particles being outside U being sufficiently small, by some
independent external potential. The following argumentation works also in this
approximate case.
We consider now a spatial coordinate transformation x′(x, t) = (x′(x, t), t) with
the following properties:
1. It is trivial (x′(x, t) = x) for t ≤ t0 and for |x| > C for some large enough C.
2. At times t > t1 > t0 for all (x, t) ∈ U we have (x′(x, t), t) 6∈ U . That means,
the image of U is contained in a set U ′ which has for t > t1 no intersection with U .
For a spatially bounded U and large enough C it is always possible to construct
such a transformation.
We apply now the hole construction as described in section 5 to x′(x, t) to
g1µν(x, t), φ1(x, t). In the first step, we have to compute the transformed func-
tions g1µν
′
(x′, t), φ′1(x
′, t) in the new coordinates. In particular, the wave function
transforms like a square root of a density, so that
(14) φ′1(x
′(x, t), t) = n(x, t)φ1(x, t)
with a weight factor n(x, t) of an irrelevant form.2 Once φ1(x, t) 6= 0 only if
(x, t) ∈ U , it follows that for t > t1 φ′1(x′, t) 6= 0 only if (x′, t) 6∈ U . Then,
following the hole argument, we replace the coordinate (x′, t) by (x, t) to obtain
the modified field configuration g′1µν(x, t), φ
′
1(x, t). Because of property (1) of the
coordinate transformation this modified configuration g′1µν(x, t), φ
′
1(x, t) fulfills the
same initial and boundary conditions as the original configuration g1µν(x, t), φ1(x, t),
thus, the two configurations are equivalent. Once by assumption the theory is
spatially background independent, the two configurations define the same state
|g1µν〉|φ1〉.
Now, because of the points 4, 5 of postulate 1 the observable θ may be computed
at the final time tout > t1 as
θ =
∫
φ1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x,
using the wave function φ1(x, t). But once the same state |g1µν〉|φ1〉 can be obtained
also by the modified configuration g1µν
′
(x, t), φ′1(x, t), θ may be computed also as
θ =
∫
φ′1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x.
By assumption, the first formula gives approximately 1. Instead, the second formula
gives (approximately) 0. Indeed, φ1(x, t) has its support in U , and because of
|〈φ1|φ2〉| ≈ 1 this holds approximately for φ2(x, t) too. But for (x, t) ∈ U we have
2To obtain that φ(x)φ(x)d3x at a given time t transforms like a measure one has to use
n(x, t) =
√
detJ−1 where J is the three-dimensional Jacobi matrix J i′
i
= ∂xi
′
/∂xi.
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φ′1(x, t) = 0. Thus, the product φ
′
1(x, t)φ2(x, t) is (approximately) zero everywhere.
In more detail,
|θ| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
φ′1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x
∣∣∣∣
≤
√∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ
′
1(x, t)d
3x
√∫
U
φ2(x, t)φ2(x, t)d3x
+
√∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ
′
1(x, t)d
3x
√∫
U
φ2(x, t)φ2(x, t)d3x
≤
√∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ
′
1(x, t)d
3x+
√∫
U
φ2(x, t)φ2(x, t)d3x
(15)
and, if the support of φ2 is in U and the support of φ
′
1 in U above integrals are
zero. But even if U is only approximately the support of the φi, the probability of
being outside U should be small, thus,
(16)
∫
U
φ2(x, t)φ2(x, t)d
3x ≤ ǫ resp.
∫
U
φ′1(x, t)φ
′
1(x, t)d
3x ≤ ǫ,
thus, |θ| ≤ 2√ǫ is approximately zero.
Thus, we have obtained two incompatible values for the same observable |θ|.
Even if we allow for some inaccuracies because of the approximations used, the
approximate results remain incompatible: 1 and 0 are not simply two different
values, but the maximal and minimal possible value for |θ|, so that certainly 1 6≈ 0
for any meaningful notion of approximation.
But a viable theory should make unique predictions for all observables. Therefore
a theory with the assumed properties is not viable. 
It is worth to note that we have applied the hole construction only to one of
the two metrics in the superpositional state. One could ask if it wouldn’t be more
appropriate to apply the same diffeomorphism to above metrics. This would corre-
spond to the notion of c-covariance considered by Anandan [1], to be distinguished
from the stronger notion of q-covariance, where different diffeomorphisms can be
applied to different metrics. But, in agreement with Anandan, it is the stronger no-
tion of q-covariance which corresponds to background freedom in the sense of GR.
In fact, the notion of “the same diffeomorphism” is simply not defined for different
solutions of GR. To define it in a meaningful way, one needs – a background.
7. Recovering the common background
An impossibility theorem seems to be something negative: It is impossible for
quantum gravity to extend a very nice and beautiful property of general relativity
– background independence – into the quantum domain. Quantum gravity would
have to be less symmetric and, therefore, less beautiful than expected by those who
argue for a background-free theory of quantum gravity.
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But we have to disagree here. In our opinion, the result is a positive one, if we
look at it from another side – from the point of view of the possibilities of obser-
vation. Theoreticians have focused their interest mainly on the loss of possibilities
caused by quantum theory – the uncertainty relations. But there is also another
side: Quantum theory gives also new possibilities for measurements. Almost all
of the impressive progress of the accuracy of our measurement devices is based on
the use of various quantum effects. But the improvement of accuracy using inter-
ference effects is not all what quantum measurements have to offer. It gives also
qualitatively new observables – additional information which cannot be gained even
in principle using only classical measurements.
A similar insight has been gained already by the Bohm-Aharonov effect: In a
region (outside a toroidal solenoid) where the EM field strength Fµν was identically
zero it was nonetheless possible to measure a nontrivial EM effect – a phase shift
in an interference picture. This phase shift may be computed by an integral over a
closed path of the gauge potential Aµ. This is a strong hint that the true degrees
of freedom of a gauge field are the gauge potentials Aµ and not the field strength
Fµν . Unfortunately, this argument is not decisive – one cannot recover the gauge
potential Aµ even if all the integrals
∮
Aµ(x)dx
µ over closed paths are known.
This leads to the question about the relation between the new quantum ob-
servables θ and the background. We have found that we need the background to
compute the observable θ. But is it possible to recover the background given all
possible observables of type θ? Or is there a similar difference as between the classi-
cal gauge potential Aµ and the observable integrals over closed paths
∮
Aµ(x)dx
µ?
This is answered by the following
Theorem 3. Assume in a quantum theory of gravity the items 1 – 5 of postulate
1 hold and there is no superselection rule which prevents superpositions of differ-
ent semiclassical states. Then we can define a common background shared by all
gravitational fields in this theory.
Proof. For an arbitrary given field gµν(x, t) we consider its superposition with some
fixed vacuum state ηµν . Because of postulate 1 item 5, observable θ, defined for
all possible experiments of this type, and, therefore, for all possible outcomes |φ1〉,
|φ2〉, is sufficient to define the sesquilinear form on H|g〉×H|η〉 completely. Because
it is non-degenerated, it can be used to define an isomorphism H|g〉 ∼= H|η〉: Every
element of H|g〉 defines a linear functional on H|η〉, thus, an element on this space.
Given this isomorphism, the position measurement on the vacuum state, defined
by some projector-valued measure on H|η〉, defines uniquely a projector-valued
measure on H|g〉. This measurement on H|g〉 defines the common background on
|g〉. 
Here, we have not used the explicit form of the scalar product as postulated in
item 6 of postulate 1. The abstract form defined by item 4 was sufficient. But the
explicit product form guarantees better properties:
Theorem 4. Assume in a quantum theory of gravity postulate 1 holds. Then the
measurement of the background position commutes with the measurement of position
on the metric gµν(x, t).
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Proof. Indeed, the coordinate x used in item 6 of postulate 1 defines position on
above metrics involved in the superpositional state. Thus, it defines a position
measurement on the metric gµν(x, t) as well as on the background ηµν . 
The construction of the background in the proof of theorem 3 contains a certain
freedom of choice – the choice of the reference state ηµν we have named “vacuum”.
But a different choice of the vacuum does not change much – it simply corresponds
to the freedom of choice of the coordinates of the common background. The identi-
fication of “the same point” in different gravitational fields will remain unchanged.
Of course, a single experiment gives always only one value θ, while for the re-
covery of the background in our construction we need all the values 〈φ1|φ2〉 for
arbitrary wave functions |φ
1
〉, |φ
2
〉. But this situation is typical in physics: To
specify whatever field configuration completely by measurement, we would need an
infinity of measurements, moreover of infinite accuracy, which is impossible. The
positivistic idea that all we use in physics has to be based on results of measure-
ments is simply nonsensical. The purpose of the theorem is a different one: It
shows that all the information which is, in each peace of it, available in principle
by measurement, is sufficient to recover the background.
This distinguishes our quantum gravity observables from the observables of the
Bohm-Aharonov effect. These do not allow to reconstruct the gauge potentials
themself, even if we would know all results of all in principle possible experiments.
The experiment gives only the gauge-invariant integrals of the gauge potential over
a closed path.
Note that to prove that the background is unobservable classically, we need the
covariance of classical general relativity. In this sense, the insight of classical GR is
far away from being lost – it is what allows us to prove that quantum measurements
are really more powerful than classical measurements.
8. Discussion
The background-freedom of GR is a really beautiful property, and the idea to
extend this property into the quantum domain has its beauty and should not be
given up too early. But those trying to find such a theory already know that this job
is almost impossible, and that in particular the problem of defining the observables
is very critical.3 Despite this, they seem quite optimistic. This suggests that they
will hardly give up reading about our impossibility theorem.
But are there any objections against our impossibility theorem which may justify
some hope? There is of course the general hope that impossibility theorems in
physics often do not hold their promises. There are lot’s of examples of impossibility
theorems which have later appeared to be based on unreasonable assumptions.4
This is not much, only a quite abstract hope. But it is sufficient to motivate us
to consider possible objections in a very careful way.
3In particular Smolin [11] notes that “. . . one cannot define the physical observables of the
theory without solving the dynamics”, and Thiemann [14] writes “. . . one must find a complete set
of Dirac observables (operators that leave the space of solutions invariant) which is an impossible
task to achieve even in classical general relativity.”
4The classical example are the various impossibility theorem for hidden variable theories, start-
ing with von Neumann’s, where one “impossible” theory is explicitly known today as de Broglie-
Bohm pilot wave theory.
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8.1. Why we consider approximations. One may think that it would be better
to consider properties of full quantum gravity directly. Using approximations is only
the cause of inaccuracies and uncertainties. The results become not only inaccurate
– we also usually do not have information about the size of the error made in the
approximation. Thus, one should use approximations only if necessary, and use
exact properties of the full theory whenever possible.
This is the normal thinking of every working scientist. It is the correct way
to think in almost all the problems scientists have to do – from developing new
theories to deriving predictions from existing theories. And it is so obvious that it
becomes part of the scientific intuition.
But there is an exception, and what we do here – to prove an impossibility theo-
rem for theories – is this exception. The logic of impossibility theorems is reverted.
The weaker the assumptions we have to make about a theory, the stronger the re-
sulting impossibility theorem. Indeed, an impossibility theorem becomes stronger
if more theories are covered, shown to be impossible. And if we make weaker as-
sumptions, more theories fulfill these assumptions and are, therefore, covered by
the impossibility theorem. A logical triviality.
But if we make assumptions about an approximation of a theory, instead of mak-
ing the same assumptions about the theory itself, we make a weaker assumption.
It covers not only the theories which exactly fulfill this assumption, but also all
those which fulfill this assumption only approximately, all those where exists some
domain of applicability of the particular approximation. This is a much larger class
of theories. And, therefore, the impossibility theorem for this much larger class of
theories is a much stronger result.
We conclude that, in an impossibility theorem, it is preferable to fix not proper-
ties of the theory itself, but, instead, properties of approximations. This preference
for approximations seems to be (judging from some reactions to earlier versions of
this paper) highly counterintuitive. And this is quite natural – the usual preference
for exact theories is correct in almost all situations and therefore easily becomes
part of the intuition.
There is also another aspect of this point. We usually use approximations because
they are simpler mathematically, which allows to solve some mathematical problems
which cannot be solved in the exact theory. This is an effect we use in this paper
too – our preference for approximations simplifies the mathematics we have to use.
But it is, again, highly counterintuitive. The one who is able to manage more
complex mathematics is intuitively the better scientist. But here we prefer to use
the simpler mathematics of approximations and claim that the result becomes even
stronger.
Nonetheless, this counterintuitive claim is correct. It is a straightforward con-
squence of the logic of impossibility proofs. To help the intuition to feel that this is
correct, it is useful to think about another problem: What is necessary to circum-
vent a given impossibility theorem.
Assume that the impossibility theorem requires an exact property of the theory.
In this case, to circumvent the impossibility theorem, one has to develop a theory
where this property does not hold exactly. If it holds only approximately, the
impossibility theorem is already no longer applicable to the new theory.
The situation is much more difficult if we assume, in the impossibility theorem,
that the property holds only in some approximation. In this case, the simple way to
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circumvent the problem no longer helps. We have to invent a more strange theory,
one where the property does not even hold approximately.
8.2. Why we prefer weaker approximations. Similar counterintuitive conclu-
sions follow if we consider the question which approximation we have to prefer.
Standard scientific intuition gives a clear answer: The more accurate, better ap-
proximation is preferable. It gives higher accuracy, and less uncertainty. But,
again, the reverted logic of impossibility proofs give another answer: An impos-
sibility theorem becomes stronger, if it fixes properties of weaker, less accurate
approximations.
The logic behind this is, of course, the same. Theories which share a weak ap-
proximation may already differ in better approximations. Thus, the class of theories
which share a given better approximation is smaller than the class of theories which
shares a weaker approximation. An impossibility theorem based on the properties
of the better approximation will cover only this smaller class of theories. But an
impossibility theorem becomes stronger if it covers more theories.
To support our intuition let’s consider again the problems faced by somebody
who wants to circumvent the impossibility theorem. The mathematics of the weaker
approximation is simpler, there are, for example, less parameters in a lower order
approximation than in a higher order approximation. As a consequence, there
is also less freedom to change the approximation to circumvent the impossibility
theorem.
But there is also another aspect of this. It is well-known and obvious that
it is easier to test experimentally lower order effects. Thus, the parameters of
lower order, weaker approximations are much more restricted by experiments. This
additionally restricts the possibilities to circumvent an impossibility theorem based
on the lower approximation.
For our quantum gravity considerations this does not apply directly – the effects
are far away from our experimental possibilities. But it applies in some indirect way.
There is also another domain – the domain where we cannot do experiments, but
where we nonetheless have good intuitions, expectations about what will happen.
And this domain of reasonable expectations has similar properties: Lower order,
weaker approximations are more restricted by our reasonable expectations than
higher order approximations.
And this is already an important point. While we have no nontrivial experiments
with decoherence caused by gravity, we have reasonable expectations about it.
They are extrapolations from decoherence caused by other interactions, supported
by the consideration of Newtonian gravity and, last but not least, by the trivial
observational support that, as long as gravity is too weak, it does not lead to
decoherence. About other quantum gravity effects (say, superpositions of black
holes, topological foam, effects near singularities) we have much less reasonable
expectations. But these reasonable expectations restrict only the weakest possible
approximations of quantum gravity. They don’t tell us anything about full quantum
gravity or higher order approximations.
Thus, it is not only preferable for impossibility theorems to fix only properties of
approximations instead of properties of the exact theory. It is also preferable to use
weaker approximation. Impossibility theorems based on weaker approximations are
stronger, cover more theories, and it is much more difficult to circumvent them.
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Nonetheless, given the counterintuitive character of this logic of impossibility
theorems, it seems useful to evaluate the particular instances where we apply such
a preference for weaker approximations.
8.3. What about strong gravitational fields? One may ask what our consid-
erations can tell us about strong gravitational fields.
The answer is simple: Nothing. Strong gravitational fields are irrelevant for our
impossibility argument. A viable theory of gravity should be able to describe all
gravitational fields, weak ones as well as strong ones. We show that a background-
free theory is already unable to handle weak gravitational fields appropriately. This
is sufficient to prove that the theory is not viable as a general theory.
A referee found this consideration “suspect”, and explained that one has to “ex-
pect problems to come from strong gravitational fields or possibly closed universes
rather than just from weak fields”. But this is only another case of the inverted
logic of impossibility theorems. For those who try to find a quantum theory of
gravity, the strong fields are much more problematic than the weak fields, and a
result which applies even to strong fields would have much higher value. But we
prove an impossibility result. And if we can prove that a certain idea fails already
for weak fields, this gives a much stronger result.
Of course, the problems related with strong fields or possibly closed universes can
be expected to be greater than those for weak fields. And for the quantum gravity
researcher it will be quite natural to care more about the more serious problems.
If one finds a way to solve the problems of strong fields, one can hope that the
problems of weak fields will be solved by the way too. But what would be the gain
of a solution of a problem for weak fields if the problems for strong fields are much
greater? A reasonable logic.
But it may be misleading. In fact, the straightforward solution of the problem
presented here – the introduction of a background – solves a lot of problems with
strong fields. In particular we no longer have to consider fields with nontrivial
topologies, and there will be no “topological foam”.
And, more important, what counts here are not the strategies of quantum gravity
researchers – it remains their freedom to decide which problems are worth to be
tackled first. The question is only if the problems with strong fields lead to some
argument against the theorem presented here. This is certainly not the case. If the
problems with weak fields are proven to be unsolvable, even greater problems with
strong fields will certainly not save the day.
8.4. What about different foliations of spacetime? We consider everything
only in a given foliation. But a background-free theory clearly should not have a
preferred foliation. So, one may ask, what about different foliations? In particular,
what about the problems with unitarity related with different foliations of spacetime
already in a Minkowski context, as described in [15]?
Again, our answer is simple: We don’t have to care about this. If the final
quantum theory of gravity is able to handle different foliations of spacetime, or if it
solves the “problem of time” in a quite trivial way, using some preferred foliation,
does not matter at all. In any case, the theory should be able to handle appropri-
ately at least one foliation of spacetime. Our theorem shows that even spatially
background-free theories are not viable, thus, a background-free theory would not
be viable even if restricted to a single foliation.
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This is yet another case of the same reverted logic of impossibility theorems: The
much greater problems related with different foliations of spacetimes will certainly
not save the day for theories which already fail to manage a single preferred foliation
correctly.
8.5. Maybe the formula for the scalar product is false? The formula for the
scalar product (7) is of central importance for our considerations. But it is a formula
supposed to be valid in a domain – superpositions of relativistic gravitational fields
– where we have no established theory. So one may argue that this formula may
be invalid in this domain.
But there is good evidence for this formula. First, it holds in the non-relativistic
limit. This is simply many-particle Schro¨dinger theory, a well-known and well-
established theory, which is in parts even supported by experiment [8]. In this
theory, the source particle and the lightweight particle are two particles which
interact via the Newtonian potential. Once the source particle is assumed to be
much heavier, and to be in states |ψ2〉 and |ψ1〉 strongly localized near the slits xi,
one can use even the one-particle theory with the Newtonian potential created by
the source particle in xi as an external field to compute ψ1/2(x, t) for the initial
value ψ1/2(x, t0) = ψ0(x):
(17) i∂tψ1/2(x, t) = (−
1
2m
∆− mM|x− x1/2|
)ψ1/2(x, t)
The resulting functions ψ1/2(x, t) define two approximate solutions of the two-
particle problem
(18) Ψ1/2(x1,x2, t) = δ(x1 − x1/2)ψ1/2(x2, t).
The derivation given in the proof of theorem 1 is then valid in two-particle theory,
with the scalar product for the lightweight particle is defined by (7). So, in this
limit, (7) holds.
But there is also another limit where (7) holds: Semiclassical theory. This theory
is applicable if the gravitational fields g1µν(x, t) and g
2
µν(x, t) are equal. In this case,
the gravitational interaction is irrelevant. But the formula nonetheless holds. If
the source particle and the lightweight particle interact in other ways, for example
electromagnetically, the formula gives nontrivial predictions for electromagnetic
interference effects in external gravitational fields. Experiments in this domain are
standard, and, given that gravitational redshift is a relativistic effect, relativistic
gravity is required.
Thus, the formula holds in two different limits: The non-relativistic as well as
the semiclassical one.
Third, we have the proof of theorem 1. What is used there are only quite general
quantum principles. Thus, even in quite different situations (quite different envi-
ronments) the result has to be of the same general type, namely a scalar product.
Moreover, we do not need the formula nor for strong gravitational field, nor as an
exact formula even for weak fields. All we need is an approximate formula for weak
relativistic fields. An approximate formula is sufficient because for the different
states constructed in our hole argument the value of |θ| varies from the maximal
possible value 1 to the minimal 0, which is clearly too much for an approximation
error.
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But even in the worst case, even if we do not have the explicit formula (7),
theorem 3 gives us an observable background. This background may not have the
nice properties following from the theorem 4, but a background is a background is
a background, and our goal was to prove that no background-free theory is viable.
8.6. Maybe Newton-Cartan is more appropriate than Newton? In the pre-
vious point, we have used Newtonian theory as the non-relativistic limit to justify
the scalar product formula. But is this justified? It is known that Newton-Cartan
theory is the correct c→∞ limit of GR, and this theory is already quantized [4].
But the Newtonian theory as a limit is not wrong – we simply need additional
restrictions to obtain it. We have preferred it because of its simplicity, in par-
ticular in application to our two-particle problem. Moreover, as we have already
mentioned, we do not have to use the most advanced approximation if we want to
prove an impossibility theorem: The weaker the approximation, the larger the class
of theories covered.
8.7. Maybe in full quantum gravity it is meaningless to talk about in-
teracting particles? In our thought experiment, we use particles as if they were
simply quantum billiard balls. But already in semiclassical field theory we have
to handle particle creation and destruction by the gravitational field, and it seems
much more appropriate to consider particles only as phenomenological, derived
objects: The fields seem to be more fundamental. In full quantum gravity the
situation may be even worse. It may become completely meaningless to talk about
particles – we don’t know yet. So, one may argue that our thought experiment
becomes meaningless in full quantum gravity.
But even in full quantum gravity there will be a domain where particles are
a good approximation. This is certainly so for the physical situations which we
observe today. And this will remain to be true in the domain of non-relativistic,
Newtonian quantum gravity. In this domain, our thought experiment clearly makes
sense.
Moreover, the theorem 1 is not restricted at all to the consideration of a single
particle, not even with some particles. Only the formula (7) depends on this. All we
need for the other points of theorem 1 is that it interacts with some other system,
which has a separate Hilbert space with a scalar product in it.
8.8. Maybe the experiment makes sense only for such weak fields that the
Newtonian limit is sufficient to handle it? If one accepts that the experiment
makes sense for some weak fields, where Newtonian gravity is able to handle it
approximately, one could try to argue the other way around: Maybe the domain
where the experiment makes sense is sufficiently small, essentially containing only
the Newtonian limit? In this case, one could argue that in this limit we can use the
fixed background of Newtonian theory to predict the result of the experiment.
There is much to answer. First, it would be doubtful that a theory which uses
the background in the Newtonian limit is background-free. It is known, in particu-
lar, that the true c→∞ limit of GR is not Newtonian theory, but Newton-Cartan
theory, which leads to Newtonian theory only if one imposes an additional condition
[4]. What will be the true c → ∞ limit of a background-free full quantum grav-
ity? It seems reasonable to guess that it will be a background-free quantization of
Newton-Cartan theory, where some principle of background-independence similar
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to definition 2 holds. This theory would face the same impossibility problem as a
background-free GR quantization.
Of course, in Newton-Cartan theory it is natural to use the background structure
which exists in this theory for quantization. But one should not expect that this
quantum theory appears as the limit of a background-free theory. It is much more
reasonable to expect this theory as the limit of a GR quantization which uses some
background too, for example, of a quantization of GR in harmonic gauge.
Second, the background exists only in the limit. It does not exist for weakly
relativistic fields. However weak the relativistic effects may be in a certain situation,
there is always some level of accuracy such that the Newtonian limit is unable to
make a sufficiently accurate prediction. For this level of accuracy, the Newtonian
limit itself already does not provide any fixed background. Of course, one would
need only an approximate background, but this approximate background should
be already a structure of relativistic gravity, different from the background in the
limit.
Third, it seems unreasonable to expect that the experiment makes sense only
in an extremely small environment of the Newtonian limit. Especially if we look
at theorem 1 and its proof, we find that the thing our source particle interacts
with does not have to be specified at all. All we need is the quite general principle
of quantum theory that the combination of a system and its environment has to
be described by a tensor product of the two Hilbert spaces, with a scalar prod-
uct defined in each of them. This general quantum principle works quite fine for
highly relativistic particles used in current particle accelerator experiments. Thus,
relativistic velocities do not seem to be problematic in any way for this principle.
Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that we will obtain some observable complex
value θ even if the lightweight particle appears highly relativistic, if there will be a
lot of relativistic particle creation and destruction, and so on.
Last but not least, even if we doubt that such fundamental principles of quantum
theory as those used in the proof of theorem 1 survive in full quantum gravity, it
is hard to expect that they start to fail already for weak to moderate relativistic
fields. But let’s consider this in some more detail.
8.9. Maybe in quantum gravity there are no tensor product structures?
In the proof of theorem 1 we have used a tensor product decomposition HS ⊗
HE of the full Hilbert space into that of the system (the heavy particle) and its
environment (the lightweight test particle). Maybe this is the weak place and there
is no such decomposition in quantum gravity? In this case, the proof of theorem 1
fails and there may be something wrong with the thought experiment.
First we object that even if this would happen, it would not mean that theorem 1
becomes automatically wrong. Nor the assumptions, nor the claims of the theorem
refer to the tensor product structure. We do not have a proposal for such a more
complicate structure and therefore cannot evaluate here the properties of such a
structure, so this remains speculative. Nonetheless, let’s note here that we do not
need much: If the two basic states |ψi〉 remain unchanged by the interaction, it
seems quite reasonable that every theory worth to be named “quantum theory”
would lead to a very close restrictions for superpositions of these states too. And
all we need to prove the theorem are the following properties of superpositions of
the |ψi〉:
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• The result will be a density matrix∑ ρij |ψi〉〈ψj | on the subspace generated
by the |ψi〉,
• and the values of the diagonal elements ρii remain unchanged.
These are assumptions which in no way refer to the tensor product structure, and
which make a lot of sense independently of any assumptions about a tensor product
structure. So they may remain valid even if the tensor product structure will be
replaced by some more complicate structure. Or, if we look at it from the other
side: A theory which violates these principles seems even more suspect than a
theory which replaces the tensor product structure by something more complicate.
But let’s nonetheless consider the worst case scenario that this doesn’t help,
and even those conditions are violated by some theory of quantum gravity. Then
the natural question is about the domain where the theorem remains valid as an
approximation.
This domain is not empty, it contains everything accessible to observation today.
As a consequence it already includes interactions which are many orders stronger
than gravitational interaction, already includes strong special-relativistic effects,
and, given that in experiments about gravitational redshifts quantum effects are
used, already includes even some gravitational effects.
Then, if the theory in question has Newtonian gravity as its non-relativistic
limit, this domain also contains non-relativistic gravity. But in Newtonian gravity
the effect may be already large. That means, the domain of applicability also
contains situations where our thought experiment gives non-trivial results.
But once nor gravity in itself, nor special relativity in itself, nor the much stronger
fields we observe in real experiments in itself, are in conflict with the theorem, one
would expect that there is also a rather large domain where all three complications
are present but the theorem nonetheless remains applicable as an approximation.
A quite different speculation leads to a similar result. Different quantum effects
will be important in different regions of the parameter space. Decoherence becomes
important whenever the gravitational fields of the particles are strong enough to
lead to a quite minimal modification of the states of a test particle. The minor
modifications of the states of test particles which are sufficient to get the maximal
effect of complete decoherence are probably undetectably small with any other
method, in particular if one remembers that even if the interaction with one particle
does not lead to observable decoherence, the interaction with many of them may
nonetheless lead to complete decoherence. Roughly speaking, if gravity is too weak
to cause decoherence, quantum gravity is not yet relevant at all. And therefore
it seems reasonable to expect that the more non-trivial quantum effects, the ones
related with modifications of fundamental quantum principles, are important only
in a much smaller region of much stronger, much more special fields.
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that even in theories where some fundamen-
tal quantum principles no longer hold, there will be a sufficiently large domain
where the decoherence is the most important quantum gravity effect, and where
the theorem is at least a good approximation.
But this would be already sufficient for us. Because, if we have such a domain
where the experiment leads to nontrivial results, then the theory has to predict
these results at least approximately. The point of the impossibility theorem was
that the result is completely undefined.
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This last point remains valid even if theorem 1 fails completely – the experiment
will give some result. Whatever it is – it has to be predicted by the theory. And
we have yet no idea how to do this in a background-free theory.
8.10. Maybe one has to consider the full experiment? There is some stan-
dard way to describe the double slit experiment, with the particle starting from
one starting point and ending at some other point at the screen. One could reason-
ably hope that a consideration which includes this full experiment does not require
the consideration of any superpositions of gravitational fields: We do not have to
consider the intermediate states, we only have to compute the amplitudes between
initial and final states.
But this simple picture of the double slit experiment is not a necessity. Instead,
it is an idealization. A more general quantum experiment starts with states which
are already superpositional states, and never have been localized in one point. In
particular, the superpositional state may be the ground state of some appropriate
double slit potential. Now, ground states may be prepared starting with an arbi-
trary state and waiting long enough for the energy being radiated away. In the
same way, one may measure if the particle has remained in the ground state after
the interaction: We look if the state radiates the energy which has been obtained
during the interaction.
Then, we do not need a description of a particular experiment, but a general
theory which allows to describe them all. But at every finite moment of time there
will be not only semiclassical states, but also their superpositions. Thus, one would
need a theory which is quite different from quantum theory: Possibly without any
information about finite times, like an S-matrix theory, possibly without superpo-
sitions as legitimate states.
8.11. But maybe the true theory of quantum gravity will be something
like an S-matrix theory? In quantum field theory, we obtain physical predictions
by computing the S-matrix. How to compute predictions beyond the S-matrix, for
finite distances, in a gauge-invariant way is not clear. But this is widely considered
as irrelevant – all what we can compare with observations is the S-matrix.
In this situation, one may expect that in quantum gravity all we can compute
is some analogon of the S-matrix as well. Taken together with some positivistic
philosophy, it could be argued that some S-matrix-like theory of quantum gravity
would be sufficient. For such a theory, it is not clear if our thought experiment
makes sense – we have used in our argument bounded states at finite times. Thus,
one may hope that restriction to some S-matrix-like theory allows to avoid this
problem.
Such a line of argumentation should be clearly rejected: The S-matrix is sufficient
only FAPP (for all practical purposes). But FAPP we simply don’t need quantum
gravity. We need quantum gravity for theoretical reasons: The true, final theory
of the universe should be able to handle effects of quantum gravity, even if we,
as human beings, are unable to test these predictions. A theory which does not
cover quantum gravity is, therefore, insufficient theoretically, even if it covers, like
semiclassical QFT on a GR background, all we can observe.
But this same line of argumentation which makes full quantum gravity interesting
for us also shows that an S-matrix-like theory, which would be unable to make
predictions for finite distances, is insufficient too. Our human experience is bounded
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to finite distances, thus, the infinite limits gives by the S-matrix are not what we
really observe, but only an approximation of our observations. If this approximation
is sufficient FAPP or not is completely irrelevant for its theoretical status as an
approximation. The true theory of the universe should be able to predict our
observations, at least in principle, with an accuracy higher than that given by the
S-matrix.
8.12. The relationalist argument. One reason for the attractiveness of the
background-independent approach is its philosophical background. While many
scientists consider philosophy as off-topic or irrelevant in scientific articles, others
(including the author) think otherwise, and articles in favour of background free-
dom, like [11], use philosophical arguments at a prominent place. So we think these
arguments are worth to be considered here too.
The philosophical argumentation in favour of a relational, background-free the-
ory goes back to the position of Leibniz, who has proposed arguments for a relational
view, against the absolute notion of space and time proposed by Newton. A nice
introduction, from point of view of the modern background-independent approach,
can be found in [11]:
“Leibniz’s argument for relationalism was based on two principles,
which have been the focus of many books and papers by philoso-
phers to the present day. The principle of sufficient reason states
that it must be possible to give a rational justification for every
choice made in the description of nature. . . . A theory that begins
with the choice of a background geometry, among many equally
consistent choices, violates this principle.. . .
One way to formulate the argument against background space-
time is through a second principle of Leibniz, the identity of the
indiscernible. This states that any two entities which share the
same properties are to be identified. Leibniz argues that were this
not the case, the first principle would be violated, as there would be
a distinction between two entities in nature without a rational ba-
sis. If there is no experiment that could tell the difference between
the state in which the universe is here, and the state in which it
is translated 10 feet to the left, they cannot be distinguished. The
principle says that they must then be identified. In modern terms,
this is something like saying that a cosmological theory should not
have global symmetries, for they generate motions and charges that
could only be measured by an observer at infinity, who is hence not
part of the universe.”
From point of view of the Popperian scientific method [9, 10] relationalism has
to be rejected as a variant of positivism, based on the priority of observation: The
observation that some entities are indiscernible requires their identification in the
theory. Instead, Popperian science is based on the priority of theory: Theories are
free guesses about Nature, and they are, in particular, free to postulate differences
between indiscernibles if this gives some other advantages. But this rejection of rela-
tionalism in principle does not diminish the heuristic value of its principles. While
we are free to postulate differences between indiscernibles, we have to take into
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account Ockham’s razor: Without good reasons to introduce differences between
indiscernibles we should nonetheless identify them.
Therefore it is important to recognize that our thought experiment invalidates
the relationalistic argumentation against the background. First, the new observable
defines a sufficient reason for the introduction of a common background: The back-
ground solves the problem of computing a prediction for the new observable, and
there is no obvious alternative way to solve this problem. It is also no longer possi-
ble to apply the principle of “identity of the indiscernible” against the background.
Indeed, superpositional states with different values for 〈φ1|φ2〉 are no longer indis-
cernible. Last but not least, the background becomes itself a relational object: As
constructed here, the background defines a relation between physical states – two
gravitational fields which are part of one superpositional state.
9. Consequences for classical gravity
We conclude that a background-free theory of quantum gravity is not viable.
This has also consequences for classical gravity, because one thing we know for
sure: That classical gravity has to be the ~ → 0 limit of quantum gravity. Once
quantum gravity has a background, then there will be such a background in classical
gravity too.
Thus, even if GR seems adequate for classical gravity, we have to incorporate
a background into classical gravity. In particular, we need an equation for the
background. Fortunately, the choice is simple – there is a nice candidate preferred
by its beauty: The harmonic coordinate condition
(19) ∂µ(g
µν√−g) = Xν = 0
is not only very beautiful condition in itself, but also simplifies the Einstein equa-
tions essentially. Harmonic coordinates have been used to prove local existence and
uniqueness results for general relativity [2, 3], so that there is no non-uniqueness
and no hole problem in GR in harmonic coordinates.
The identification of the background with harmonic coordinates already leads to
some interesting modifications of GR: The topology of the solutions has to be trivial,
we have a new notion of completeness (a solution is complete if it is defined for all
values −∞ < Xµ < ∞ of the harmonic coordinates Xµ, while the metric gµν(x)
no longer has to be geodesically complete), and we have a symmetry preference for
the flat FRW universe (it is the only homogeneous universe).
Further modifications appear if we don’t want to add the harmonic condition
as an additional external equation, but want to obtain it as an Euler-Lagrange
equation. The natural way to do this is to add a covariance-breaking term
(20) LGR → LGR + γαβgµνXα,µXβ,ν
√−g
for some constants γαβ so that the harmonic condition becomes an Euler-Lagrange
equation
(21)
δS
δXα
= γαβX
β.
This leads to additional terms in the Einstein equations. While we obtain the
Einstein equations in the natural limit γαβ → 0, this leads to even more qualitative
modifications of GR even for arbitrary small values γαβ : Gravitons obtain a mass,
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we obtain stable “frozen stars” instead of black holes, and a “big bounce” instead
of a big bang, and without the GR big bang and black hole singularities [7, 6, 12].5
10. Conclusion
We have proven that a background-free quantum theory of gravity is not viable,
is unable to predict the result of simple quantum experiments.
This is not simply yet another item on the long list of problems of “we don’t
know what to do” type on the way to such a theory. We know what to do. The
background has been found to be observable in quantum theory. All the information
contained in the background is in principle accessible by experiments of the type
proposed in this paper. So, the solution is straightforward – one has to introduce
a common background into the theory of gravity.
This result is not only relevant for quantum gravity – we have to introduce the
background into classical gravity too, which leads to important modifications.
The experiment considered in this paper measures a weak field effect, one of
the weakest quantum gravity effects imaginable. But the solution of the problem
– the introduction of a background – simplifies quantization also for strong fields
because we do no longer have to speculate about different topologies, wormholes,
or topological foam.
Let’s conclude with a remarkable observation: As in this case, as in the case of
the Bohm-Aharonov effect the objects which allow to compute the new quantum
observables – the background as well as the gauge potential – have been known
long before quantum theory. This is a lecture about the remarkable power of math-
ematical simplicity and beauty, and the counterproductiveness of the positivistic
rejection of unobservables.
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